论文信息 - Design of the 3G Spectrum Auctions in the UK and Germany: An Experimental Investigation

Design of the 3G Spectrum Auctions in the UK and Germany: An Experimental Investigation

Abstract This paper analyses the auction designs chosen for awarding 3G licences in the UK and Germany and compares them with respect to revenues and bidders’ surplus using a laboratory experiment. In our study with a given number of bidders, the German design leads to higher revenues. However, bidder surplus in the German design is lower and bidders face a severe exposure problem. Because this might discourage participation, it will probably lead to less competitive bidding in real applications.

Karl-Martin Ehrhart | S. Seifert

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