Game theoretical models of the cooperative carrier behavior

This paper presents a multi-level modeling approach which captures the cooperative behavior of carriers in maritime freight transportation networks. Ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators are considered. Port terminal operators are regarded as a special type of carrier for modeling purposes. Ocean carriers are the leaders in a maritime shipping market. Port terminal operators are the followers of ocean carriers as well as the leaders of land carriers. For cooperating ocean and land carriers, compensation principle is used to find the optimal service charge and routing pattern that maximize their total profit, while port terminal operators act competitively. The concept of Stackelberg game is applied to a multi-level game, assuming a single ocean shipping company (leader) through an alliance. Subsequently, the paper considers cooperation between ocean carriers and port terminal operators, while individual carriers within the same group are considered to act competitively. Cooperative games within the same carrier group and between different groups of carriers are examined and compared with competitive games. A numerical example is presented to demonstrate the validity of the developed model.

[1]  Dongjoo Park,et al.  On-line Estimation of Departure Time-Based Link Travel Times from Spatial Detection System , 2009 .

[2]  A. Nagurney,et al.  Oligopolistic and competitive behavior of spatially separated markets , 1987 .

[3]  Terry L. Friesz,et al.  STACKELBERG GAMES ON A NETWORK WITH COURNOT‐NASH OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITORS , 1991 .

[4]  Hai Yang,et al.  Three-player game-theoretic model over a freight transportation network , 2007 .

[5]  Patrick T. Harker,et al.  THE USE OF EQUILIBRIUM NETWORK MODELS IN LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT : WITH APPLICATION TO THE U.S. COAL INDUSTRY , 1985 .

[6]  Patrick T. Harker,et al.  PREDICTION OF INTERCITY FREIGHT FLOWS I. THEORY , 1986 .

[7]  Yang Zan.  Analysis of container port policy by the reaction of an equilibrium shipping market , 1999 .

[8]  Patrick T. Harker,et al.  Multiple Equilibrium Behaviors on Networks , 1988, Transp. Sci..

[9]  Joaquı́n de Cea Ch,et al.  A multi-modal supply–demand equilibrium model for predicting intercity freight flows , 2003 .

[10]  Ning Xu.  A dynamic model of integrated production-transportation operations , 2009 .

[11]  Sotirios Theofanis,et al.  Modeling Carrier Interactions in an International Freight Transport System , 2014, Int. J. Inf. Syst. Supply Chain Manag..

[12]  Patrick T. Harker,et al.  Prediction of intercity freight flows, II: Mathematical formulations , 1986 .

[13]  T. C. Edwin Cheng,et al.  A Multiproduct, Multicriterion Supply-Demand Network Equilibrium Model , 2006, Oper. Res..

[14]  Dongjoo Park,et al.  A New Paradigm for Freight Demand Modeling: The Physical Distribution Channel Choice Approach , 2010 .

[15]  A. Nagurney.  Network Economics: A Variational Inequality Approach , 1992 .

[16]  Ning Xu,et al.  A Dynamic Spatial Price Equilibrium Model of Integrated Urban Production-Transportation Operations Considering Freight Delivery Tours , 2016, Transp. Sci..

[17]  Katsuhiko Kuroda,et al.  International container transportation network analysis considering the post-panamax class container ship , 2002 .

[18]  Tingfa Zhang,et al.  Bi-level programming model of container port game in the container transport supernetwork , 2009 .

[19]  William J. Hurley,et al.  Nonlinear Tariffs and Freight Network Equilibrium , 1994, Transp. Sci..

[20]  Teodor Gabriel Crainic,et al.  A Multimode Multiproduct Network Assignment Model for Strategic Planning of Freight Flows , 1987, Transp. Sci..

[21]  Gyeong Seok Kim,et al.  Functional Networking of Logistics Port Cities in Northeast Asia , 2010 .

[22]  Xiaoning Zhang,et al.  Stackelberg games and multiple equilibrium behaviors on networks , 2007 .

[23]  Athanasios K. Ziliaskopoulos,et al.  Shipper-Carrier Dynamic Freight Assignment Model Using a Variational Inequality Approach , 2006 .