“Better to be safe than to be sorry”: Extinguishing the individual – group discontinuity effect in competition by cautious reciprocation

The individual – group discontinuity effect entails that in mixed-motive situations, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG), intergroup interactions are more competitive than inter-individual interactions. Based on Pruitt and Kimmel's (1977) goal/expectation theory and Axelrod's (1984) cooperation theory, we propose a cautious reciprocation model (CRM), which specifies variables that extinguish or reduce the discontinuity effect by enhancing intergroup cooperation. The model entails that, relative to individuals, the cooperative decisions of the more rational and instrumental group members are more strongly determined by a combination of a concern for long-term greed and a fear of anticipated retaliation, leading them to become more responsive to changes in the PDG task and/or social environment, and to follow an instrumental, cautious reciprocation technique. This technique is measured by increases in the level of cooperation (or competition) shown by groups in reaction to changes in the PDG decisions of the other party, or to experimental manipulations in the PDG task environment (i.e., time perspective, reciprocal strategies, reward structure, sequential vs simultaneous play). A summary of the findings of several earlier Utrecht studies and of recent discontinuity research by Insko, Schopler and co-workers yields evidence for the CRM.