Distributed Auction Mechanism for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks

Dynamic spectrum allocation is an efficient approach to enhance the efficiency of spectral utilization by cognitive users (unlicensed users). Auction mechanism is one approach by which the cognitive users get a portion of the unused licensed band for lease from the primary users (licensed users). The multi-winner auction is a new challenge to the existing auction mechanisms like (Vickrey–Clarke-Groves) VCG and Second price auction. In this work, we have manipulated the pricing based auction mechanism among cognitive users. Specifically, the proposed mechanism enhances the spectral efficiency of the cognitive users and also motivates the primary users to lease the bands to the cognitive users with increased primary user revenue. The proposed mechanism also ensures fairness among cognitive users. Simulation results show that our mechanism increases the spectral efficiency of cognitive users and the revenue of primary users.

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