The executive mind and double-loop learning

and questionable. Recall that there was a high degree of consistency and agreement in the way the executives diagnosed Y's actions toward X. It was "obvious" to most of the executives that Y had behaved counterproductively. But the features of the human mind that make it efficient may also lead to counterproductive consequences. Why? Because, as we have seen, there can be differences between the executives' views and Y's. But so what? Cannot human beings differ in their views? Of course they can. But if they wish to reduce the number of misunderstandings when they do differ, they should test the validity of their reasoning. Why do people choose not to test the validity of their reasoning? First, because they believe their reasoning is obvious and correct. Second, because they hold a theory of human defensiveness that tells them that the recipient will probably not listen, or will probably become defensive if he does. And it makes little sense for them to test their views with someone who, they believe, will be defensive. Third, in a Model I world, testing makes the testers vulnerable. They could discover that they are wrong! They could lose unilateral control and they could generate negative feelings, consequences that would violate their Model I governing values. The same counterproductive reasoning and consequences have been shown to occur when executives deal with technical and organizational problems. The only requirement is that the problems are threatening to some of the key players involved. Once the players diagnose the problem as threatening, they use the same reasoning described in the X–Y case. Other Examples of the Consequences of Model I Reasoning People programmed to be in unilateral control and to maximize winning tend to have difficulties in dealing with paradoxes. Paradoxes contain contradictions, and holding contradictory views makes the actor vulnerable to criticisms of being vague or self-contradictory. It is not surprising to learn from Louis B. Barnes's insightful descriptions that the way executives deal with paradoxes may be counterproductive. Barnes’s observation Theory of action explanation Often we fail to go beyond our initial reactions in order to look at deeper levels of the issue. Do not run the risk of losing control and making yourself vulnerable — that is, losing Issues fall in opposing camps; hard data and facts are better than soft ideas and speculation Create win / lose dynamics. Seek hard data to win, to prevent losing. Abhor speculation lest you become vulnerable Turning to organizational consequences, recall that people who use Model I tend, as we have seen, to create misunderstanding, self-fulfilling prophecies, self-sealing processes, and escalating error. This drives people to follow Model I behavior even more closely in an attempt to maintain control, to win. It also creates competitive win / lose group and intergroup dynamics with many protective games that are undiscussable. And that undiscussability is itself undiscussable. The Model I world is, as the executives reported to Barnes, "an unsafe place where nice guys finish last." An excellent illustration of these consequences at the group, intergroup, and interagency level can be found in a recently published story of the interaction among Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall, and President Carter and his aides regarding welfare reform. The players acted toward each other in Model I ways. Califano kept secret for a long time his doubts of genuine welfare reform at zero cost increase. The President sensed