论文信息 - The impossibility of a Paretian rational: A Bayesian perspective

The impossibility of a Paretian rational: A Bayesian perspective

Abstract If a group takes a collective decision on the basis of separately aggregated group judgments on the probabilities of independent events, there may not exist any anonymous aggregation rule that respects individuals' unanimous outcome preferences at all profiles of beliefs.

Klaus Nehring | K. Nehring

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