Arms Race and Military Expenditure Models

This review primarily covers quantitative studies of armament issues published during the 1970s. In addition, it surveys significant earlier works, summarizes other reviews, and recommends directions for future research. It categorizes one type of research as “Arms-Building Models” (including Richardson and bureaucratic models) that describe how nations build their military forces. It also groups another type: Lanchester “Arms-Using Models” describe how force attrition occurs in battle. The review subclassifies studies of both types according to their level of analysis (international, national, and so on). These classifications permit conclusions such as these: (a) Social and psycho-logical factors are poorly represented in existing models. (b) Bureaucratic models are often better predictors than Richardson-type models. (c) Arms-Using Models can assess military effectiveness, but they cannot provide reliable policy guidance at present. (d) Future studies of issues neglected in the past, using recently developed empirical data, show promise for rapid progress.

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