Benefit sharing for BIM implementation: Tackling the moral hazard dilemma in inter-firm cooperation

Abstract Building information modeling (BIM) plays an important role in furthering value-creation of construction projects by advocating the inter-firm cooperation. When implementing BIM, however, individual firms inherently safeguard their self-interests regardless of the fact that inter-firm cooperation might reap joint BIM benefits for a project overall, which epitomizes a typical problem of moral hazards in project-based organizations. This paper develops an outcome-linked benefit sharing model that considers sharing joint BIM benefits among stakeholders including designers, contractors, and clients for tracking moral hazards therein. By modeling stakeholders' behaviors as evolutionary games within a principal–agent formalism, it has been deducted that (1) designers/contractors could be incentivized to cooperate had each stakeholder received a share higher than the quotient of BIM costs over value-creation in the design/construction phase; and (2) how joint BIM benefits can be more than noncooperation outcomes is key for clients to support BIM implementation.

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