The FOREVER service for fault/intrusion removal

This paper introduces FOREVER, a novel service that can be used to enhance the resilience of replicated systems, namely those exposed to malicious attacks. The main objective of FOREVER is to remove faults and intrusions that may happen during system execution, and such removal is done by combining both evolution and recovery techniques. The paper presents (i.) the challenges that systems exposed to malicious attacks need to address, and (ii.) how FOREVER can be used to tackle these challenges.

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