Equilibrium, Games, and Pricing in Transportation and Telecommunication Networks

Network equilibrium models that have traditionally been used for transportation planning have penetrated in recent years to other scientific fields. These models have recently been introduced in the telecommunication networks literature, as well as in the field of game theory. Researchers in the latter fields are not always aware of the very rich literature on equilibrium models outside of their application area. On the other hand, researchers that have used network equilibrium models in transportation may not be aware of new application areas of their tools. The aim of this paper is to present some central research issues and tools in network equilibria and pricing that could bring closer the three mentioned research communities.

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