Path Deviations Outperform Approximate Stability in Heterogeneous Congestion Games

We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This model encompasses several well-studied extensions of the classical Wardrop model which incorporate, for example, risk-aversion, altruism or travel time delays. Our main goal is to analyze the worst-case deterioration in social cost of a deviated Nash flow (i.e., for the perturbed latencies) with respect to an original Nash flow.

[1]  Evdokia Nikolova,et al.  The Burden of Risk Aversion in Mean-Risk Selfish Routing , 2014, EC.

[2]  Alexander Schrijver,et al.  Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency. , 2003 .

[3]  Paul G. Spirakis,et al.  On the Performance of Approximate Equilibria in Congestion Games , 2008, Algorithmica.

[4]  Igal Milchtaich,et al.  Network Topology and the Efficiency of Equilibrium , 2005, Games Econ. Behav..

[5]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Risk Averse Agents , 2014, ArXiv.

[6]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Worst-case Equilibria , 1999, STACS.

[7]  Lisa Fleischer,et al.  Linear tolls suffice: New bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks , 2005, Theor. Comput. Sci..

[8]  Po-An Chen,et al.  Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy , 2014, TEAC.

[9]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  On the severity of Braess's Paradox: Designing networks for selfish users is hard , 2006, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..

[10]  J. Wardrop.  ROAD PAPER. SOME THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF ROAD TRAFFIC RESEARCH. , 1952 .

[11]  J. G. Wardrop,et al.  Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research , 1952 .

[12]  Guido Schäfer,et al.  The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Games , 2016, Theory of Computing Systems.

[13]  Evdokia Nikolova,et al.  Asymptotically Tight Bounds for Inefficiency in Risk-Averse Selfish Routing , 2015, IJCAI.

[14]  Michel X. Goemans,et al.  Matroids Are Immune to Braess' Paradox , 2015, Math. Oper. Res..

[15]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Stronger Bounds on Braess's Paradox and the Maximum Latency of Selfish Routing , 2011, SIAM J. Discret. Math..

[16]  Thomas Franke,et al.  Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria , 2010, Theory of Computing Systems.