论文信息 - An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property

An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property

In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payoffs change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by this fairness property, efficiency and the null player property. These three axioms also characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games.

René van den Brink | R. Brink

[1] P. Dubey. On the uniqueness of the Shapley value , 1975 .

[2] R. Myerson. Conference structures and fair allocation rules , 1978 .

[3] Hans Haller,et al. Collusion properties of values , 1994 .

[4] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Graphs and Cooperation in Games , 1977, Math. Oper. Res..

[5] S. Hart,et al. Potential, value, and consistency , 1989 .

[6] E. Kalai,et al. On weighted Shapley values , 1983 .

[7] Johannes Rene van den Brink. Relational power in hierarchical organizations , 1994 .

[8] H. Young. Monotonic solutions of cooperative games , 1985 .

[9] L. Shapley. A Value for n-person Games , 1988 .

[10] G. Owen. Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value , 1975 .

[11] G. Laan,et al. Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value , 1998 .

[12] Youngsub Chun,et al. On the symmetric and weighted shapley values , 1991 .

[13] E. Leher. An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value , 1988 .

[14] Lloyd S. Shapley,et al. Additive and non-additive set functions , 1953 .

[15] R. Brink. An axiomatization of the disjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure , 1997 .