Safety and Security Architectures for Avionics

In computer systems, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components offer extended functionalities for a reasonable cost, and consequently have an important economic advantage. However, such components are hard to integrate into critical systems because of the integrity requirements placed on such systems. To alleviate this problem, we consider the use of Totel’s integrity model (Totel et al., 1998), a model for managing multiple levels of integrity and allowing the use of fault tolerance techniques to validate information flow from low integrity components to high integrity ones. We propose the use of virtualization as a means to diversify COTS components running on the same physical machine and to control information flow on this machine.

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