论文信息 - Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree

Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree

Abstract The Condorcet winner is a natural choice as the winner of an election, when it exists. When preferences are restricted to be single-peaked on a tree, it is known that there is a Condorcet winner. We give an algorithm for determining whether or not a set of preferences is single-peaked on some tree. Finding this tree is useful for two reasons: its form may reflect the perceptions of the candidates by the electorate, and the existence of a tree guarantees stronger, more difficult to check, properties.

Michael A. Trick | M. Trick

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