In this expository paper we illustrate the generality of game theoretic probability protocols of Shafer and Vovk (2001) in finite-horizon discrete games. By restricting ourselves to finite-horizon discrete games, we can explicitly describe how discrete distributions with finite support and the discrete pricing formulas, such as the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula, are naturally derived from game-theoretic probability protocols. Corresponding to any discrete distribution with finite support, we construct a finite-horizon discrete game, a replicating strategy of Skeptic, and a neutral forecasting strategy of Forecaster, such that the discrete distribution is derived from the game. Construction of a replicating strategy is the same as in the standard arbitrage arguments of pricing European options in the binomial tree models. However the game theoretic framework is advantageous because no a priori probabilistic assumption is needed.
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