Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

Summary.This paper studies repeated games with imperfect private monitoring when there exists a third-party mediator who coordinates play by giving non-binding instructions to players on which action to take and by collecting their private information. The paper presents a Nash-threat folk theorem for a communication equilibrium based on such mediation when monitoring is jointly $\epsilon$-perfect in the sense that every player is almost perfectly monitored collectively by other players.

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