Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible

I Analysis of the complex anti-satellite (ASAT) issue is still in its infancy. There are signs, however, that the subject will have to grow up fast in the coming year. The Geneva arms control negotiations seem likely to depart the familiar terrain of strategic and theater nuclear weapons and launch into the lesser-known reaches of space. As the ASAT issue gains prominence, members of the national security community will need to acquaint themselves with its specialized jargon and technologies. Just as a rudimentary understanding of throwweight, flight times, and post boost vehicles is indispensable to discussion of strategic forces and arms control, so a modest knowledge of orbits and satellites is necessary for informed discussion of ASAT. One purpose of this article is to provide that background to non-technical readers. Military and technical analysis, of course, will play only a modest part in the ASAT policy process, getting submerged quickly in the swirl of domestic politics, posturing at the negotiating table, legalisms, and bureaucratic interests. In addition, the political agenda of conciliation or competition with the Soviet Union is a paramount, and within limits legitimate, basis for supporting or rejecting an arms control approach. Yet behind these political