When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War

How effective are parliamentary democracies at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages? Are parliamentary democracies any better at doing this than presidential democracies? In order to answer these questions, the research project uses an in-depth analysis of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War as a case study. This article seeks to determine how effective the United Kingdom was at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages. In general we observe that the United Kingdom suffered from many of the same problems in executing a coercive strategy as presidential governments do.

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