Frictional Matching Models

This article reviews the developments in frictional matching models from 1990 to 2010, exploring how search frictions skew the matches that occur. This research succeeded by exploiting new tools from monotone methods under uncertainty. Seeing how this journey plays out is instructive in itself for economic theory. The article also describes in detail the different attacks on the existence of equilibrium required for these search and matching models.

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