The Eect of Civilian Nuclear Assistance on the Depth of Nuclear Safeguards

Growing domestic energy demands have led many states to pursue civilian nuclear development. Why do some of these states commit to deeper non-proliferation obligations and nuclear safeguards while others do not? This paper argues that the need to obtain nuclear assistance from established nuclear powers provides recipient states with incentives to make costly commitments restraining their ability to use civilian resources for a military nuclear program. I evaluate this hypothesis using data on signature and ratication of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which grants the IAEA substantial authority to monitor and inspect a state’s domestic nuclear activities. I nd that receiving civilian nuclear assistance from a Nuclear Suppliers Group member increased the overall likelihood that a recipient state signed and brought into force an Additional Protocol. These ndings suggest that the spread of civilian nuclear commerce may have positive eects for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by bringing nascent nuclear states deeper into the international nuclear safeguards system.

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