Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules

Abstract We study the problem of providing a menu of identical public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over [0,1]. A decision rule selects for each preference profile and for each public good a location. In Miyagawa (1998a, PhD dissertation) an agent consumes of each menu without rivalry only his most preferred public good. We extend preferences from [0,1] to the set of alternatives lexicographically. We identify a certain agent who might leave, and require population-monotonicity only if he leaves the entire population. When we provide two public goods, we characterize the class of single-plateaued preference rules by Pareto-optimality, anonymity, and population-monotonicity.

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