Shaping Large Population Agent Behaviors Through Entropy-Regularized Mean-Field Games

Mean-field games (MFG) were introduced to efficiently analyze approximate Nash equilibria in large population settings. In this work, we consider entropy-regularized meanfield games with a finite state-action space in a discrete time setting. We show that entropy regularization provides the necessary regularity conditions, that are lacking in the standard finite mean field games. Such regularity conditions enable us to design fixed-point iteration algorithms to find the unique meanfield equilibrium (MFE). Furthermore, the reference policy used in the regularization provides an extra means, through which one can control the behavior of the population. We first formulate the problem as a stochastic game with a large population of N homogeneous agents. We establish conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the limiting case as N tends to infinity, and we demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium for the infinite population case is also an -Nash equilibrium for the N -agent regularized game, where the sub-optimality is of order O ( 1/ √ N ) . Finally, we verify the theoretical guarantees through a resource allocation example and demonstrate the efficacy of using a reference policy to control the behavior of a large population of agents.