Anonymity in Giving in a Natural Context : A Field Experiment in 30 Churches

Abstract The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in 30 Dutch churches. For a period of 29 weeks, the means by which offerings are gathered is determined by chance, prescribing for each offering the use of either ‘closed’ collection bags or open collection baskets. When using baskets, attendees can see the contribution made by their direct neighbors as well as the total amount already gathered. Contributions to offerings with an external cause initially increase by 10% when baskets are used, but this effect peters out over time. No effect is found for offerings with an internal cause. This result can be explained by the presence of social incentives, but is also in line with recent studies showing that asymmetric information about the quality of the charity leads to increased contributions.

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