Retailers and Consumers in Sequential Auctions of Collectibles

We analyse an independent private-value model, where heterogeneous bidders compete for objects sold in sequential second-price auctions. In this heterogeneous game, bidders may have differently distributed valuations, and some have multi-unit demand with decreasing marginal values (retailers); others have a specific single-unit demand (consumers). By examining equilibrium bidding strategies and price sequences, we show that the presence of consumers leads to more aggressive bidding from the retailers on average and heterogeneous bidders is a plausible explanation of the price decline effect. The study of the expected revenue of the seller confirms the interest of auctioneers in inviting different types of bidders.

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