Secure Communications in Smart Grid: Networking and Protocols

Abstract The key attributes of a smarter power grid include: pervasive interconnection of smart devices; extensive data generation and collection; and rapid reaction to events across a widely dispersed physical infrastructure. Modern telecommunications technologies are being deployed across power systems to support these monitoring and control capabilities. To enable interoperability, several new communications protocols and standards have been developed over the past 10 to 20 years. These continue to be refined, even as new systems are rolled out. This new hyper-connected communications infrastructure provides an environment rich in sub-systems and physical devices that are attractive to cyber-attackers. Indeed, as smarter grid operations become dependent on interconnectivity, the communications network itself becomes a target. Consequently, we examine cyber-attacks that specifically target communications, particularly state-of-the-art standards and protocols. We further explore approaches and technologies that aim to protect critical communications networks against intrusions, and to monitor for, and detect, intrusions that infiltrate Smart Grid systems.

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