Spatial-Temporal Demand Management and Benefit Allocation for Geo-Distributed Charging Station and EV Aggregators

This paper presents a spatial-temporal demand management scheme and cooperative benefit allocation method to optimize the operation of geo-distributed charging station and EV aggregators. Considering the spatial-temporal characteristics of electric vehicle charging demand and energy cost distribution, we first propose a collaborative demand management model to optimize the dispatch of the charging demand and maximize the social welfare. After that, a two-stage cooperative benefit allocation mechanism based on Nash bargaining and Shapley value theory is proposed to allocate the incremental social welfare while avoiding the conflict between individual interests and collective interests. A case study with multiple testing scenarios is provided to evaluate the performance of proposed demand management model and benefit allocation mechanism. The numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed model, which not only improves the operation efficiency of charging stations and EV aggregators but also achieves a benefit allocation solution that guarantees individual and collective rationalities.

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