Validating Human Behavior Representation Model of General Personnel During Offshore Emergency Situations

With the advancement of simulation-based training, intelligent agents that can display human-like behavior have become common. From military combat simulations to nuclear power plant simulation, agents have been widely used to facilitate team training (as team mates, opponents, or both). Credibility of these agents is vital to ensure a sound training process. Credibility of the agents largely depends on the credibility of the underlying human behavior representation (HBR) model. This is why validation of the HBR model is necessary to ensure realistic agent behavior. However, the non-deterministic nature of the HBR and the subjectivity in experts’ judgment during the validation process make HBR model validation more challenging compared to physics based models. This paper presents the validation process of an HBR model of general personnel created for use in an offshore emergency training simulator. Three types of agents (naïve, in-between, and ideal) are created in the simulator using the HBR model. The paper discusses the use of empirical evidence as referents, along with subject matter experts. A two-level three factor experiment was conducted using 36 participants. Several performance metrics were collected during the experiment, including route selected for evacuation, time to muster, time spent running, interaction with fire doors and watertight doors, interaction with hazards, and reporting to the muster station. Data collected during the experimental study have been used in this paper to demonstrate how the use of empirical evidence can facilitate HBR validation. High-level tasks performed during HBR validation are discussed in detail. Special emphasis is given on acceptability criteria testing to ensure that the HBR model performs adequately under different operating conditions. Results show that the proposed HBR model meets the acceptability criteria requirement for all types of agents. In general, the ideal agents exhibited safe behavior during offshore emergency egress, whereas the naïve and in-between agents showed erroneous behavior at times. For example, during the simulation runs of a critical emergency scenario where the primary egress route was obstructed by a hazard, the ideal agents either waited and listened to the public address announcement and followed an alternative egress route (60% cases), or they initially chose their preferred route but re-routed immediately after encountering the hazard (40% cases). In all cases, the in-between agents started with their preferred route and re-routed after encountering the hazard, and the naïve agents proceeded with their preferred route even when the route was compromised.