论文信息 - Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods - 字舞流文

Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

Jerry R. Green | J. Laffont

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