The Essence of the Modern Corporation Markets, Strategic Decision-Making and the Theory of the Firm

Following Coase's fundamental concern with planning, this paper highlights strategic decision making as important for distinguishing the essence of the modern large corporation. It is consistent with industrial organization analysis of industries yet provides a novel starting point for the theory of the firm. The authors suggest different boundaries to the organization compared to those identified elsewhere and, whereas others peering into the black box of Walrasian theory merely see more of what is on the outside, they see transactions within and without the firm as fundamentally different. The analysis recognizes Pareto inefficiencies but concludes with an optimistic vision for economic policy. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester

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