Pollution claim settlements under private information

[1]  J. Harsanyi.  Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points , 1968 .

[2]  J. Harsanyi.  Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game , 1968 .

[3]  Martin P. Loeb,et al.  INCENTIVES AND PUBLIC INPUTS , 1975 .

[4]  C. d'Aspremont,et al.  Incentives and incomplete information , 1979 .

[5]  Jerry R. Green,et al.  Incentives in public decision-making , 1979 .

[6]  K. Arrow.  The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete Information**This work was supported by National Science Foundation under Grant No. SOC75-21820 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. , 1979 .

[7]  Eric Maskin,et al.  A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms , 1979 .

[8]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[9]  M. Satterthwaite,et al.  Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .

[10]  Robert H. Wilson.  Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions , 1985 .

[11]  William Samuelson.  Game-theoretic models of bargaining: A comment on the Coase theorem , 1985 .

[12]  Charles R. Plott,et al.  Public goods provision in an experimental environment , 1985 .

[13]  P. Cramton,et al.  Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently , 1985 .

[14]  E. Hoffman,et al.  Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups , 1986, The Journal of Legal Studies.