Pakistan's Dangerous Game

increase NATO’s role. As General David Richards, the British commander of NATO forces there, acknowledged: ‘I haven’t got enough [troops to] win this.’1 There is growing evidence, however, that the solution lies not in Afghanistan, but across the Khyber Pass in Pakistan. The implications for NATO are profound. Increasing the number of foreign troops or improving the competence of Afghan forces are no longer sufficient. Success requires a difficult political and diplomatic feat: convincing the government of Pakistan to undermine the insurgent sanctuary on its soil. I conducted extensive interviews with United States, NATO, United Nations and Afghan officials in Afghanistan in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. The conclusions are stark. There is significant evidence that the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), al-Qaeda, and other insurgent groups use Pakistan as a sanctuary for recruitment and support. In addition, there is virtual unanimity that Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has continued to provide assistance to Afghan insurgent groups. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States and NATO had little choice but to adopt a convenient alliance with Pakistan to overthrow the Taliban government and help capture or kill key al-Qaeda terrorists. But the rising level of violence in Afghanistan has increasingly altered the United States’ and Europe’s cost–benefit calculus. Historical evidence suggests that the ability of insurgents to gain sanctuary in neighbouring states and secure assistance from state and non-state actors significantly increases their success. The cost of failing to clamp down on the insurgent sancPakistan’s Dangerous Game