Suppressing natural heuristics by formal instruction: The case of the conjunction fallacy

Abstract A basic principle of probability is the conjunction rule, p( B ) ⩾ p( AB rather, it stems from the absence of generally useful problem-solving designs that bring extensional principles to bear on this class of problem. We predict that when helpful extensional strategies are made available, they should compete well with intensional heuristics. Two experiments were conducted, using as subjects adult women with little mathematical background. In Experiment 1, brief training on concepts of algebra of sets, with examples of their use in solving problems, reduced conjunction-rule violations substantially, compared with a control group. Evidence from similarity judgments suggested that use of the representativeness heuristic was reduced by the training. Experiment 2 confirmed these training effects and also tested the hypothesis that conjunction-rule violations are due to misunderstanding of “B” as “B and not A.” Changes in detailed wording of the propositions to be ranked produced substantial effects on judgment, but the pattern of these effects supported the hypothesis that, for the type of problem used here, most conjunction errors are due to use of representativeness or availability. We conclude that such intensional heuristics can be suppressed when alternative strategies are taught.

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