Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Sven de Vries,et al. On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.
[2] Lawrence M. Ausubel. An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities , 2006 .
[3] David C. Parkes,et al. Auction design with costly preference elicitation , 2005, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence.
[4] Anthony M. Kwasnica,et al. A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions , 2005, Manag. Sci..
[5] Marshall L. Fisher,et al. The Lagrangian Relaxation Method for Solving Integer Programming Problems , 2004, Manag. Sci..
[6] Jie Zhong,et al. Computing price trajectories in combinatorial auctions with proxy bidding , 2004, Electron. Commer. Res. Appl..
[7] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Effectiveness of query types and policies for preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..
[8] D.C. Parkes,et al. Distributed implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..
[9] David C. Parkes,et al. Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation , 2004, EC '04.
[10] David C. Parkes,et al. Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions Using Primal-Dual Algorithms∗ , 2004 .
[11] David C. Parkes,et al. Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation in the Generalized Vickrey Auction , 2004 .
[12] Avrim Blum,et al. Preference Elicitation and Query Learning , 2004, J. Mach. Learn. Res..
[13] Noam Nisan,et al. Multi-player and Multi-round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication , 2003, ESA.
[14] David Porter,et al. Combinatorial auction design , 2003, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[15] Avrim Blum,et al. On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries , 2003, EC '03.
[16] Noam Nisany,et al. The Communication Requirements of E¢cient Allocations and Supporting Lindahl Prices¤ , 2003 .
[17] Kyna G. Fong,et al. Multi-Stage Information Acquisition in Auction Design , 2003 .
[18] Sushil Bikhchandani,et al. The Package Assignment Model , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.
[19] Noam Nisan,et al. Auctions with severely bounded communication , 2002, The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings..
[20] A. Roth,et al. Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet , 2002 .
[21] Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding , 2002 .
[22] David C. Parkes,et al. Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions , 2002, AMEC.
[23] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions , 2001, AAMAS '02.
[24] David C. Parkes,et al. An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction , 2002 .
[25] Joseph W. Koterski. On the Virtues , 2002 .
[26] Daniel Lehmann,et al. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities , 2001, EC '01.
[27] T. Sandholm,et al. Costly valuation computation in auctions , 2001 .
[28] David C. Parkes,et al. Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency , 2001 .
[29] Y. Shoham,et al. Truth revelation in rapid, approximately efficient combinatorial auctions , 2001 .
[30] Michael P. Wellman,et al. AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction , 2000, EC '00.
[31] David C. Parkes,et al. Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.
[32] David C. Parkes,et al. Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.
[33] Ennio Stacchetti,et al. The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.
[34] Mark M. Bykowsky,et al. Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem , 2000 .
[35] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.
[36] P. Jehiel. On the virtues of the ascending price auction : New insights in the private value setting , 2000 .
[37] Peter R. Wurman,et al. Equilibrium Prices in Bundle Auctions , 1999 .
[38] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions , 1999, IJCAI 1999.
[39] Faruk Gul,et al. WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITH GROSS SUBSTITUTES , 1999 .
[40] Paula J. Brewer. Decentralized computation procurement and computational robustness in a smart market , 1999 .
[41] Peter R. Wurman,et al. Market structure and multidimensional auction design for computational economies , 1999 .
[42] David C. Parkes,et al. Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems , 1999, Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce.
[43] J. Ledyard,et al. A NEW AND IMPROVED DESIGN FOR MULTI-OBJECT ITERATIVE AUCTIONS , 1999 .
[44] Ronald M. Harstad,et al. Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions , 1998 .
[45] William J. Cook,et al. Combinatorial optimization , 1997 .
[46] P. Cramton. The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment , 1997 .
[47] Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason,et al. Generalized Vickrey Auctions , 1994 .
[48] Linus Schrage,et al. An Auction Method for Course Registration , 1993 .
[49] Michael P. Wellman. A Market-Oriented Programming Environment and its Application to Distributed Multicommodity Flow Problems , 1993, J. Artif. Intell. Res..
[50] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations , 1993, AAAI.
[51] Dimitri P. Bertsekas,et al. The Auction Algorithm for Assignment and Other Network Flow Problems , 1991 .
[52] M. Rothkopf,et al. Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? , 1990, Journal of Political Economy.
[53] J. Banks,et al. Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: an experimental approach. , 1989, The Rand journal of economics.
[54] Dimitri P. Bertsekas,et al. Dynamic Programming: Deterministic and Stochastic Models , 1987 .
[55] D. Gale,et al. Multi-Item Auctions , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.
[56] H. Leonard. Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions , 1983, Journal of Political Economy.
[57] V. Crawford,et al. Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes , 1982 .
[58] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding , 1982 .
[59] Kenneth Steiglitz,et al. Combinatorial Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity , 1981 .