Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

[1]  Sven de Vries,et al.  On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.

[2]  Lawrence M. Ausubel.  An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities , 2006 .

[3]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Auction design with costly preference elicitation , 2005, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence.

[4]  Anthony M. Kwasnica,et al.  A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions , 2005, Manag. Sci..

[5]  Marshall L. Fisher,et al.  The Lagrangian Relaxation Method for Solving Integer Programming Problems , 2004, Manag. Sci..

[6]  Jie Zhong,et al.  Computing price trajectories in combinatorial auctions with proxy bidding , 2004, Electron. Commer. Res. Appl..

[7]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Effectiveness of query types and policies for preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..

[8]  D.C. Parkes,et al.  Distributed implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..

[9]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation , 2004, EC '04.

[10]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions Using Primal-Dual Algorithms∗ , 2004 .

[11]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation in the Generalized Vickrey Auction , 2004 .

[12]  Avrim Blum,et al.  Preference Elicitation and Query Learning , 2004, J. Mach. Learn. Res..

[13]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Multi-player and Multi-round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication , 2003, ESA.

[14]  David Porter,et al.  Combinatorial auction design , 2003, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[15]  Avrim Blum,et al.  On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries , 2003, EC '03.

[16]  Noam Nisany,et al.  The Communication Requirements of E¢cient Allocations and Supporting Lindahl Prices¤ , 2003 .

[17]  Kyna G. Fong,et al.  Multi-Stage Information Acquisition in Auction Design , 2003 .

[18]  Sushil Bikhchandani,et al.  The Package Assignment Model , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[19]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Auctions with severely bounded communication , 2002, The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings..

[20]  A. Roth,et al.  Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet , 2002 .

[21]  Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al.  Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding , 2002 .

[22]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions , 2002, AMEC.

[23]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions , 2001, AAMAS '02.

[24]  David C. Parkes,et al.  An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction , 2002 .

[25]  Joseph W. Koterski.  On the Virtues , 2002 .

[26]  Daniel Lehmann,et al.  Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities , 2001, EC '01.

[27]  T. Sandholm,et al.  Costly valuation computation in auctions , 2001 .

[28]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency , 2001 .

[29]  Y. Shoham,et al.  Truth revelation in rapid, approximately efficient combinatorial auctions , 2001 .

[30]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction , 2000, EC '00.

[31]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[32]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[33]  Ennio Stacchetti,et al.  The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

[34]  Mark M. Bykowsky,et al.  Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem , 2000 .

[35]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.

[36]  P. Jehiel.  On the virtues of the ascending price auction : New insights in the private value setting , 2000 .

[37]  Peter R. Wurman,et al.  Equilibrium Prices in Bundle Auctions , 1999 .

[38]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions , 1999, IJCAI 1999.

[39]  Faruk Gul,et al.  WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITH GROSS SUBSTITUTES , 1999 .

[40]  Paula J. Brewer.  Decentralized computation procurement and computational robustness in a smart market , 1999 .

[41]  Peter R. Wurman,et al.  Market structure and multidimensional auction design for computational economies , 1999 .

[42]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems , 1999, Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce.

[43]  J. Ledyard,et al.  A NEW AND IMPROVED DESIGN FOR MULTI-OBJECT ITERATIVE AUCTIONS , 1999 .

[44]  Ronald M. Harstad,et al.  Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions , 1998 .

[45]  William J. Cook,et al.  Combinatorial optimization , 1997 .

[46]  P. Cramton.  The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment , 1997 .

[47]  Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason,et al.  Generalized Vickrey Auctions , 1994 .

[48]  Linus Schrage,et al.  An Auction Method for Course Registration , 1993 .

[49]  Michael P. Wellman.  A Market-Oriented Programming Environment and its Application to Distributed Multicommodity Flow Problems , 1993, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[50]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations , 1993, AAAI.

[51]  Dimitri P. Bertsekas,et al.  The Auction Algorithm for Assignment and Other Network Flow Problems , 1991 .

[52]  M. Rothkopf,et al.  Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? , 1990, Journal of Political Economy.

[53]  J. Banks,et al.  Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: an experimental approach. , 1989, The Rand journal of economics.

[54]  Dimitri P. Bertsekas,et al.  Dynamic Programming: Deterministic and Stochastic Models , 1987 .

[55]  D. Gale,et al.  Multi-Item Auctions , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.

[56]  H. Leonard.  Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions , 1983, Journal of Political Economy.

[57]  V. Crawford,et al.  Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes , 1982 .

[58]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  A theory of auctions and competitive bidding , 1982 .

[59]  Kenneth Steiglitz,et al.  Combinatorial Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity , 1981 .