Regulatory Compliance and the Ethos of Quality Enhancement: Surprises in Nuclear Power Plant Operations1

Regulatory Compliance and the Ethos of Quality Enhancement: Surprises in Nuclear Power Plant Operations Todd R. La Porte Department of Political Science University of California, Berkeley Working Paper SO^EHNMENTAL > iimm FcB 1 0 1994 INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BFRKFLFY

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