论文信息 - On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games

On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games

The purpose of this paper is to re-state and re-examine the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games. It is also proposed to discuss T.C. Schelling’s recent criticism of some game-theoretical postulates, in particular the symmetry postulate [15, 16].

John C. Harsanyi | J. Harsanyi

[1] J. Harsanyi. Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility , 1955 .

[2] J. Nash. Two-Person Cooperative Games , 1953 .

[3] F. Zeuthen. Problems of monopoly and economic warfare , 1930 .

[4] J. Harsanyi. A bargaining model for the cooperative n-person game , 1958 .

[5] Thomas C. Schelling,et al. Bargaining, communication, and limited war , 1957 .

[6] J. Neumann,et al. Theory of games and economic behavior , 1945, 100 Years of Math Milestones.

[7] J. Nash. THE BARGAINING PROBLEM , 1950, Classics in Game Theory.

[8] Neil Cooper,et al. Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher , 1955 .

[9] H. Raiffa. 21. Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two-person Games , 1953 .

[10] Philip Wolfe,et al. Contributions to the theory of games , 1953 .

[11] Thomas C. Schelling,et al. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory , 1959 .

[12] Howard Raiffa,et al. Games And Decisions , 1958 .

[13] T. Schelling. The strategy of conflict . Prospectus for a reorientation of game theory , 1958 .

[14] J. Marschak,et al. Elements for a Theory of Teams , 1955 .

[15] John C. Harsanyi,et al. Approaches to the Bargaining Problem before and after the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s Theories , 1956 .