A MULTI-AGENT CONGESTION AND PRICING MODEL

A multi-agent model of travelers competing to utilize a roadway in time and space is presented in this paper to illustrate the effect of congestion and pricing on traveler behaviors and network equilibrium. To realize the spillover effect among travelers, N-player games are constructed in which the strategy set includes N+1 strategies. We solve the N-player game (for N ≤ 7) and find Nash equilibria if they exist. This model is compared to the bottleneck model. The results of numerical simulation show that the two models yield identical results in terms of lowest total costs and marginal costs when a social optimum exists.

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