Representation and analysis of coordinated attacks

In this paper, we propose a formal model of coordinated attacks in which several attackers cooperate towards a common malicious goal. The model investigates both attack planning and vulnerability analysis, thereby providing a uniform approach to system and adversary modelling. In addition, the model is general enough to explain both coordinated and single attacks. In the paper, we define the notion of coordinated-attack graph, propose an algorithm for efficient generation of coordinated-attack graphs, demonstrate how coordinated-attack can be used for vulnerability analysis, and discuss an implementation of a coordinated-attack graph. Coordinated-attack graphs can facilitate a wide range of tasks, such as model checking, opponent modelling, intrusion response, sensor configuration, and so forth. In addition, they can be used in robotic warfare, where several intelligent software agents automatically produce and launch coordinated attacks.

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