The Value of Information and Optimal Organization.

The article addresses the issue of optimal organization of production. I compare three organizational forms: centralization (one agent produces different inputs), decentralization (each of two agents produces a different input and contracts directly with the principal), and delegation (two agents produce different inputs, the principal contracts with one of them only). The optimal organizational form depends on the degree of complementarity/substitutability between the inputs in the final use. The degree of complementarity/substitutability also determines whether delegation is payoff equivalent to the two-agent mechanism from the point of view of the principal. In the context of delegation, I consider which of the two agents should serve as the primary contractor. I also address the issue of collusion between the agents in a decentralized organization and characterize the conditions under which a stake of collusion exists. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.

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