Optimizing spectrum value through flexible spectrum licensing

Latest developments in radio access are radically changing the management of the spectrum for mobile services, progressing from exclusive licensing with static conditions towards more flexible licensing schemes, which allow a dynamic spectrum assignment. In this context, spectrum transactions between participating actors can generate mutual benefits. However, the fact that these transactions typically generate interference between users requires a clear definition of that interference and any associated benefit. This paper analyzes realistic cases of spectrum transactions between two operators, considering different service requirements and generated interference in the context of flexible spectrum licensing. The simulated transactions suggest that the optimal level of interference is usually above zero, and given a fixed spectrum bandwidth, an increase in demand results in additional gains in a scheme, which allows voluntary transactions with flexible interference respect to a scheme. This in turn restricts or minimizes interference. Finally, this paper provides guidelines for achieving the most beneficial type of spectrum transaction. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a concrete scheme in which interference is traded within a transaction to optimize the value of the spectrum.

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