论文信息 - Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard

Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard

Abstract An attempt is made to account for the frequently observed phenomenon of insurance companies offering discounts to clients who possess a favorable record of past claims. We argue that such discounts provide a mechanism which enables both insurer and insured to counteract the inefficiency which arises from moral hazard.

Ariel Rubinstein | A. Rubinstein | M. Yaari | Menahem E. Yaari

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