Corporate Governance and Control
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] R. Glenday. Business Forecasting: A Quantitative Investigation of the Influence of Money on Trade Development , 1932 .
[2] Sendhil Mullainathan,et al. Agents with and Without Principals , 2000 .
[3] Hamid Mehran,et al. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance , 1995 .
[4] J. Tirole. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations , 1986 .
[5] Andrei Shleifer,et al. Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World , 1998 .
[6] J. Tirole,et al. Formal and Real Authority in Organizations , 1997, Journal of Political Economy.
[7] Francesca Cornelli,et al. Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers , 2002 .
[8] Mathias Dewatripont,et al. A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence , 1994 .
[9] Jan Svejnar. Relative Wage Effects of Unions, Dictatorship and Codetermination: Econometric Evidence from Germany , 1981 .
[10] K. V. Nuys. Corporate governance through the proxy process*1: Evidence from the 1989 Honeywell proxy solicitation , 1993 .
[11] Abbie J. Smith,et al. Measuring Executive-Compensation - Methods And An Application , 1985 .
[12] J. Pound. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight , 1988 .
[13] Steven N. Kaplan,et al. Mergers and Productivity , 2000 .
[14] S. R. Kole. The complexity of compensation contracts , 1997 .
[15] H. Manne. Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting. An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle , 1964 .
[16] Charles W. Calomiris. U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective , 2000 .
[17] Andrei Shleifer,et al. Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers , 1987 .
[18] L. Zacharias,et al. The Economic Structure of Corporate Law , 1993 .
[19] Andrei Shleifer,et al. Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process , 1988 .
[20] Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance , 1995 .
[21] Michael Bradley,et al. Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms , 1988 .
[22] D. P. Baron,et al. Tender Offers and Management Resistance , 1983 .
[23] Mark Twain,et al. The gilded age : a tale of to-day : in two volumes , 1873 .
[24] Philippe Aghion,et al. Contracts as a barrier to entry , 1987 .
[25] Erik Berglöf. A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance , 1994 .
[26] Annette B. Poulsen,et al. Shark repellents and stock prices: The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980 , 1987 .
[27] Clifford G. Holderness,et al. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control , 2001 .
[28] P. S. Florence. The Logic of British and American Industry , 1953 .
[29] Albert S. Kyle,et al. Noise Trading and Takeovers , 1991 .
[30] Andrew Winton,et al. Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention , 1998 .
[31] P. Bolton,et al. An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting , 1992 .
[32] M. Conyon,et al. A Review of Compliance with Cadbury , 1997 .
[33] Martin Lipton,et al. Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson , 2001 .
[34] A. Shleifer,et al. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation , 1999 .
[35] A. Shleifer,et al. The takeover wave of the 1980s. , 1991, Science.
[36] David M. Kreps. Corporate culture and economic theory , 1990 .
[37] H. A. Cushing. Voting Trusts; A Chapter in Recent Corporate History , 1915 .
[38] Axel Börsch-Supan,et al. An Applied Econometricians' View of Empirical Corporate Governance Studies , 2000 .
[39] Stuart Rosenstein,et al. Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth☆ , 1990 .
[40] B. Klein,et al. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process , 1978, The Journal of Law and Economics.
[41] Mike Burkart,et al. Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests , 1995 .
[42] R. Romano. Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance , 2002 .
[43] D. Fischel,et al. The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis , 1986 .
[44] W. Mikkelson,et al. The decline of takeovers and disciplinary managerial turnover , 1997 .
[45] Ronald J. Gilson,et al. Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors , 1991 .
[46] H. Radice. Control Type, Profitability and Growth in Large Firms: an Empirical Study , 1971 .
[47] J. Macey. An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties , 1991 .
[48] E. Ofek,et al. Diversification's effect on firm value , 1995 .
[49] I. Welch,et al. BONDHOLDER LOSSES IN LEVERAGED BUYOUTS , 1993 .
[50] R. Romano. Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation , 1998 .
[51] Sendhil Mullainathan,et al. Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are , 2001 .
[52] M. Hellwig. Financial Intermediation with Risk Aversion , 2000 .
[53] G. Means. The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States , 1930 .
[54] F. Easterbrook. International Corporate Differences: Markets or Law? , 1996 .
[55] S. Prigge. A Survey of German Corporate Governance , 1999 .
[56] Bernard Black. Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice , 1992 .
[57] Steven N. Kaplan,et al. Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.
[58] Benjamin E. Hermalin,et al. Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature , 2000 .
[59] Oliver Hart,et al. The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership , 1996 .
[60] Jeffrey Zwiebel,et al. Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control , 1995 .
[61] Stijn Claessens,et al. Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia , 2000 .
[62] R. Gilson. Lipton and Rowe's Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply , 2001 .
[63] Ralph A. Walkling,et al. Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids , 1994 .
[64] Chun Chang. Capital Structure as an Optimal Contract Between Employees and Investors , 1992 .
[65] W. Bratton,et al. Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference , 2000 .
[66] S. Myers. Determinants of corporate borrowing , 1977 .
[67] H. Levy. Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock , 1983 .
[68] Benjamin E. Hermalin,et al. The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance , 1991 .
[69] L. Bebchuk,et al. Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers , 1999 .
[70] Janet Mitchell. PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM AND INTERGENERATIONAL CONFLICT IN A MODEL OF COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE GROWTH , 1990 .
[71] Colin Mayer,et al. New issues in corporate finance , 1988 .
[72] M. Josephson. The robber barons : the great American capitalists, 1861-1901 , 1962 .
[73] H. Degryse,et al. Informatie en de rol van financiële intermediatie , 1998 .
[74] M. Porter. CAPITAL CHOICES: CHANGING THE WAY AMERICA INVESTS IN INDUSTRY , 1992 .
[75] M. C. Jensen,et al. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers , 1999 .
[76] Raghuram G. Rajan,et al. Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.
[77] Brian G. M. Main. The rise and fall of executive share options in Britain , 1999 .
[78] Kee H. Chung,et al. Corporate ownership and the value of a vote in an emerging market , 1999 .
[79] Marco Becht,et al. Easd Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations , 2000 .
[80] Michael Bradley,et al. THE RATIONALE BEHIND INTERFIRM TENDER OFFERS Information or Synergy , 1983 .
[81] Frank Heflin,et al. Blockholder Ownership and Market Liquidity , 2000 .
[82] Benjamin E. Hermalin,et al. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO , 1998 .
[83] The corporation in modern society , 1959 .
[84] Frederic S. Mishkin,et al. Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't , 2001 .
[85] Robert S. Harris,et al. Shareholder wealth effects of corporate takeovers : The U.K. experience 1955-1985 , 1989 .
[86] L. White,et al. Why Do CEOS Reciprocally Sit on Each Other's Boards? , 2000 .
[87] O. Hart,et al. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.
[88] B. Black,et al. The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets , 2000 .
[89] Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden,et al. Blocks, liquidity and corporate control , 1998 .
[90] R. Gilson. Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It) , 2000 .
[91] D. Scharfstein. The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers , 1988 .
[92] R. Gilson,et al. Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets , 1997 .
[93] O. Hart,et al. Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership , 1998 .
[94] Gary B. Gorton,et al. Banking in transition economies: does efficiency require instability? , 1998 .
[95] A. Shleifer,et al. Legal Determinants of External Finance , 1997 .
[96] J. Bradford DeLong,et al. Did J. P. Morgan's Men Add Value? An Economist's Perspective on Financial Capitalism , 1991 .
[97] M. Gurdon,et al. Codetermination and enterprise performance: Empirical evidence from West Germany , 1990 .
[98] L. Starks,et al. Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation , 2000 .
[99] Douglas W. Diamond. Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring , 1984 .
[100] W. Streeck,et al. Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen der Mitbestimmung , 1999 .
[101] Kevin J. Murphy,et al. The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom , 2000 .
[102] María Gutiérrez. An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors' Fiduciary Duties , 2003 .
[103] James K. Brown,et al. Corporate directorship practices : role, selection and legal status of the board , 1975 .
[104] Franklin Allen,et al. 比较金融系统 = Comparing financial systems , 2000 .
[105] E. Lazear,et al. An Economic Analysis of Works Councils , 1994 .
[106] Jeffrey N. Gordon. Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley , 2003 .
[107] Michael C. Walker,et al. The Effect of Stock Splits on the Ownership Structure of Firms , 1997 .
[108] Kenneth A. Borokhovich,et al. CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments , 1997 .
[109] Robert J. Larner. Management control and the large corporation , 1970 .
[110] Anup Agrawal,et al. Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover , 1998 .
[111] John J. McConnell,et al. Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital-market response to bank loan agreements , 1989 .
[112] Steven Huddart. The effect of a large shareholder on corporate value , 1993 .
[113] Luigi Zingales,et al. What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes , 1995 .
[114] Edward B. Rock,et al. R. Kraakman et al.: The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach , 2004 .
[115] John Mcconnell,et al. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value , 1990 .
[116] Kathryn E. Spier,et al. Incomplete Contracts and Signalling , 1992 .
[117] Larry H. P. Lang,et al. The Separation of Ownership and Control: An Analysis of Ultimate Ownership in Western European Corporations , 2000 .
[118] P. Gourevitch,et al. How shareholder reforms can pay foreign policy dividends , 2002 .
[119] Kenneth J. Martin,et al. The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans , 1999 .
[120] Eddy Wymeersch,et al. A status Report on Corporate Governance Rules and Practices in Some Continental European States' (Hopt, K.J., Kanda, H., Roe, M.J., Wymeersch, E., Prigge, S. (eds.) , 1999 .
[121] J. Mirrlees. The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I , 1999 .
[122] O. Williamson,et al. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. , 1977 .
[123] M. Roe. Corporate Law’s Limits , 2002, The Journal of Legal Studies.
[124] Hamid Mehran,et al. Regulation and the market for corporate control: Hostile tender offers for electric and gas utilities , 1995 .
[125] R. Gilson. A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers , 1981 .
[126] Luc Renneboog,et al. Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the UK , 1998 .
[127] Ralf Elsas,et al. Is relationship lending special? Evidence from credit-file data in Germany☆ , 1998 .
[128] Homer V. Cherrington. Business organization and finance , 1948 .
[129] M. C. Jensen,et al. Eclipse of the Public Corporation , 1999 .
[130] Jeffrey D. Kubik,et al. Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts , 2003 .
[131] Oliver Hart,et al. Firms, contracts, and financial structure , 1995 .
[132] J. Grundfest. Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians inside the Gates , 1993 .
[133] S. Kaplan. Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S , 1992 .
[134] Krishna G. Palepu,et al. Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature , 2000 .
[135] E. H. Kim,et al. American Finance Association The Impact of Merger Bids on the Participating Firms ' Security Holders , 2007 .
[136] E. Friedman,et al. Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis , 2000 .
[137] H. Hansmann,et al. The Ownership of Enterprise , 1996 .
[138] J. Schumpeter,et al. Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process , 1940 .
[139] J. A. Livingston. The American stockholder , 1958 .
[140] M. Whinston,et al. Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence , 1986 .
[141] H. Demsetz,et al. Corporate Control, Insider Trading, and Rates of Return , 1986 .
[142] C. Geoffrey. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes , 1986 .
[143] L. Bebchuk,et al. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation , 2002 .
[144] Sanford J. Grossman,et al. The free-rider problem and the theory of the corporation , 1980 .
[145] Ronald C. Anderson,et al. Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of Debt , 2003 .
[146] Stanley A. Kaplan,et al. The Structure of the Corporation , 1977 .
[147] Stuart L. Gillan,et al. The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting , 2002 .
[148] Marco Pagano,et al. The Political Economy of Corporate Governance , 1999 .
[149] Anil Shivdasani,et al. The Effect of Bank Relations on Investment Decisions: An Investigation of Japanese Takeover Bids , 2000 .
[150] Benjamin E. Hermalin,et al. Trends in Corporate Governance , 2003 .
[151] Katharina Pistor. Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies , 2000, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms.
[152] C. Muus. Non-voting shares in France: An empirical analysis of the voting premium , 1998 .
[153] Bengt Holmstrom,et al. Managerial Incentives and Capital Management , 1986 .
[154] Sanford J. Grossman,et al. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration , 1986 .
[155] D. Leech,et al. The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement , 1983 .
[156] M. Porter,et al. Capital disadvantage: America's failing capital investment system. , 1992, Harvard business review.
[157] Stuart L. Gillan. Option-Based Compensation: Panacea or Pandora's Box? , 2001 .
[158] R. Roll,et al. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers , 1986 .
[159] Florencio López‐de‐Silanes,et al. Law and Finance , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.
[160] David Hirschleifer,et al. Chapter 26 Mergers and acquisitions: Strategic and informational issues , 1995, Finance.
[161] Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden,et al. Liquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theory of Corporate Ownership Structure , 1998 .
[162] Douglas W. Diamond. Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets , 1989, Journal of Political Economy.
[163] Marco Pagano,et al. The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public , 1998 .
[164] John Kenneth Galbraith. The New Industrial State , 1967 .
[165] Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden,et al. Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors , 1994 .
[166] David F. Larcker,et al. The association between performance plan adoption and corporate capital investment , 1983 .
[167] L. Hannah. Takeover Bids in Britain Before 1950: An Exercise in Business ‘Pre-History’ , 1974 .
[168] Stijn Claessens,et al. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings , 2002 .
[169] W. Streck,et al. Mittbestimmung in Deutschland. Tradition und Effizienz , 1999 .
[170] M. Hellwig. Banks, Markets, and the Allocation of Risks in an Economy , 1997 .
[171] Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications , 2001 .
[172] L. Bebchuk,et al. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy , 2002 .
[173] J. Coffee. The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications , 1999 .
[174] M. C. Jensen,et al. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems , 1993, A Theory of the Firm.
[175] P. Angelini,et al. Availability and cost of credit for small businesses: Customer relationships and credit cooperatives , 1998 .
[176] Stefan Krasa,et al. Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary , 1992 .
[177] M. Epstein,et al. Beteiligungs-und Finanzierungs-Gesellschaften. , 1910 .
[178] M. Zenner,et al. CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation? , 2000 .
[179] O. Williamson. The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations , 1971 .
[180] D. R. Roberts,et al. Top Executive Pay Package. , 1963 .
[181] Denis Gromb,et al. Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm , 1997 .
[182] John E. Core,et al. Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations , 2004 .
[183] J. Tirole,et al. Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives , 2004 .
[184] G. Nicodano. Corporate groups, dual-class shares and the value of voting rights , 1998 .
[185] Douglas W. Diamond. Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt , 1991, Journal of Political Economy.
[186] J. Cable. CAPITAL MARKET INFORMATION AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE: THE ROLE OF WEST GERMAN BANKS* , 1985 .
[187] Hayne E. Leland,et al. INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION , 1977 .
[188] M. Petersen. Pension Reversions and Worker-Stockholder Wealth Transfers , 1992 .
[189] V. Carosso. Washington and Wall Street: The New Deal and Investment Bankers, 1933–1940 , 1970, Business History Review.
[190] V. Jog,et al. Price Effects of Dual-Class Shares , 1986 .
[191] John C. Coates. The Contestability of Corporate Control: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence on Takeover Defenses , 1999 .
[192] R. Romano. The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation? , 1991 .
[193] W. A. Sahlman,et al. The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations , 1990 .
[194] Robert T. Masson,et al. Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance , 1971, Journal of Political Economy.
[195] Clifford G. Holderness,et al. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: An exploratory analysis , 1988 .
[196] Jeremy I. Bulow,et al. Toeholds and Takeovers , 1998, Journal of Political Economy.
[197] J. Coffee. Convergence and its Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and Control? , 2000 .
[198] Patrick Bolton,et al. Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.
[199] E. Meade. Trust Finance: A Study of the Genesis, Organization, and Management of Industrial Combinations , 2002 .
[200] P. Bolton. Privatization and the separation of ownership and control: lessons from Chinese enterprise reform , 1995 .
[201] R. David,et al. Major legal systems in the world today: An introduction to the comparative study of law , 1978 .
[202] Jonathan L. Johnson,et al. Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of Ceo Compensation , 1998 .
[203] T. Veblen. Absentee Ownership: Business Enterprise in Recent Times - The Case of America , 1945 .
[204] THE GREAT REVERSALS: THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20th CENTURY ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS NO. 265 , 2000 .
[205] Jeremy Edwards,et al. Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany. , 1995 .
[206] Ernst G. Maug,et al. Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control? , 1998 .
[207] John J. Mcconnell,et al. Corporate Mergers and the Co-insurance of Corporate Debt , 1977 .
[208] Per Strömberg,et al. Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts , 2000 .
[209] D. Hirshleifer,et al. Managerial performance, boards of directors and takeover bidding , 1994 .
[210] L. Bebchuk,et al. A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition , 2001 .
[211] C. R. Knoeber,et al. Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers , 1986 .
[212] Michael J. Fishman. A theory of preemptive takeover bidding , 1988 .
[213] R. Rajan,et al. Is the Glass-Steagall Act justified? A study of the U.S. experience with universal banking before , 1994 .
[214] M. Clarkson,et al. For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees , 1998 .
[215] Barry Nalebuff,et al. To The Raider Goes The Surplus? A Reexaminationof the Free‐Rider Problem , 1992 .
[216] Kevin J. Murphy,et al. Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers , 1989 .
[217] Douglas W. Diamond. Capital markets and financial intermediation: Bank loan maturity and priority when borrowers can refinance , 1993 .
[218] S. R. Kole. Measuring managerial equity ownership: a comparison of sources of ownership data , 1995 .
[219] James Angel,et al. Factors Affecting the Value of the Stock Voting Right: Evidence from the Swiss Equity Market , 1996 .
[220] Frank Packer,et al. What role has the "Main Bank" played in Japan? , 1988 .
[221] Myeong-Hyeon Cho,et al. Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: an empirical analysis , 1998 .
[222] A. Bhide. The hidden costs of stock market liquidity , 1993 .
[223] Lemma W. Senbet,et al. Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness , 1997 .
[224] H. DeAngelo,et al. Proxy contests and the governance of publicly held corporations , 1989 .
[225] M. Aoki,et al. The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview , 1995 .
[226] A. Chandler. The Development of Modern Management Structure in the US and UK , 1976 .
[227] P. Holl. Effect of Control Type on the Performance of the Firm in the U.K , 1975 .
[228] Jeremy C. Stein,et al. Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior , 1989 .
[229] Vincent A. Warther. Board effectiveness and board dissent: A model of the board's relationship to management and shareholders , 1998 .
[230] David Yermack,et al. Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements , 1995 .
[231] Sheilagh Ogilvie,et al. Universal banks and German industrialization: a reappraisal' , 1996 .
[232] Paul A. Gompers,et al. The venture capital cycle , 1999 .
[233] L. Bebchuk,et al. A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance , 1999 .
[234] Ekkehart Boehmer. Business Groups, Bank Control and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers , 1999 .
[235] B. Olivier,et al. Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. , 1994 .
[236] Jean Tirole,et al. Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring , 1993, Journal of Political Economy.
[237] Thomas Andersson,et al. Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth , 2000 .
[238] S. Kaplan. Federated's Acquisition and Bankruptcy: Lessons and Implications , 1994 .
[239] H. Demsetz,et al. The Cost of Transacting , 1968 .
[240] Bernard Black. Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States , 1997 .
[241] Christopher M. James,et al. Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans , 1987 .
[242] M. Petersen,et al. The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data , 1994 .
[243] Eric Maskin,et al. Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies , 1995 .
[244] Coffee,et al. Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor , 1991 .
[245] Renée B. Adams. What Do Boards Do? Evidence from Board Committee and Director Compensation Data , 2003 .
[246] Kristian Rydqvist. Takeover bids and the relative prices of shares that differ in their voting rights , 1992 .
[247] John S. Levin. Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity, and Entrepreneurial Transactions , 2005 .
[248] Barton L. Lipman,et al. Successful Takeovers without Exclusion , 1988 .
[249] Francis Bloch,et al. Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests , 2003 .
[250] P. Cramton,et al. Relational Investing and Agency Theory , 1994 .
[251] Mitsuhiro Fukao. Financial integration, corporate governance, and the performance of multinational companies , 1995 .
[252] W. Z. Ripley. Main Street and Wall Street , 1927 .
[253] Donald John Roberts,et al. Shareholder Interests, Human Capital Investment and Corporate Governance , 2000 .
[254] Thomas Hellmann,et al. Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization , 2002 .
[255] V. Rosenbaum. Corporate takeover defenses , 2004 .
[256] O. Williamson. Employee ownership and internal governance: A perspective , 1985 .
[257] R. Rajan,et al. Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial Bank Securities Activities Before the Glass-Steagall Act , 1995 .
[258] R. Chernow. The house of Morgan , 1990 .
[259] Frank Partnoy,et al. Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic Principles , 1986 .
[260] Philippe Aghion,et al. Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies , 1999 .
[261] Paul Davies,et al. Gower's Principles of modern company law , 1979 .
[262] Atulya Sarin,et al. Ownership Structure and Stock Market Liquidity , 1996 .
[263] Mike Burkart,et al. Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders , 1998, Journal of Political Economy.
[264] Gary B. Gorton,et al. Class Struggle Inside the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination , 2000 .
[265] D. Scharfstein,et al. Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships , 1989 .
[266] James A. Brickley,et al. The impact of long-range managerial compensation plans on shareholder wealth , 1985 .
[267] Wilbur G. Lewellen,et al. Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations. , 1968 .
[268] Robert Gibbons,et al. Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence , 1992 .
[269] J. Bartlett. Venture Capital: Law, Business Strategies, and Investment Planning , 1988 .
[270] G. Schwert,et al. Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder? , 1999 .
[271] Robert Hessen. The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal , 1983, The Journal of Law and Economics.
[272] Shorey Peterson,et al. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. , 1933 .
[273] Rebel A. Cole,et al. The Importance of Relationships to the Availability of Credit , 1998 .
[274] Chi‐Nien Chung,et al. Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance , 1995 .
[275] Jaime F. Zender. Optimal Financial Instruments , 1991 .
[276] R. Romano. Corporate Law and Corporate Governance , 1996 .
[277] Bernard S. Black,et al. Shareholder Passivity Reexamined , 1990 .
[278] Erik Stafford,et al. New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers , 2001 .
[279] W. Cary. Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware , 1974 .
[280] M. Weisbach. Outside directors and CEO turnover , 1988 .
[281] A. Berle. The 20th century capitalist revolution , 1954 .
[282] Finance, Investment and Growth , 2003 .
[283] Haim Mendelson,et al. Number of Shareholders and Stock Prices: Evidence from Japan , 1999 .
[284] Larry H. P. Lang,et al. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations , 1999 .
[285] M. Pagano,et al. Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control , 2002 .
[286] Michael C. Jensen,et al. The market for corporate control , 1983 .
[287] L. Bebchuk. The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot , 2003 .
[288] G. Nicodano,et al. Private Benefits, Block Transaction Premiums and Ownership Structure , 2000 .
[289] Stephen Choi. Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 Sec Proxy Reforms , 2000 .
[290] Gerald F. Davis,et al. Top Management, Company Directors and Corporate Control , 2001 .
[291] Jeremy C. Stein,et al. Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.
[292] H. Short. Ownership, Control, Financial Structure and the Performance of Firms , 1994 .
[293] S. Prowse,et al. Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the U.S. and Japan , 1990 .
[294] Atulya Sarin,et al. Securities Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Analysis , 2000 .
[295] R. Gordon,et al. Business Leadership in the Large Corporation , 1945 .
[296] Brian F. Smith,et al. Relative Prices of Dual Class Shares , 1995, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
[297] Jonathan M. Karpoff. The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings , 2001 .
[298] G. Schwert,et al. Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrent and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures , 1993 .
[299] Marco Pagano,et al. The Geography of Equity Listing; Why Do Companies List Abroad? , 2002 .
[300] Reinier Kraakman,et al. The End of History for Corporate Law , 2000 .
[301] Colin Mayer,et al. Ownership and Control , 1995 .
[302] Artur Raviv,et al. Financial contracting theory , 1993 .
[303] R. Hubbard,et al. THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCK OWNERSHIP: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED , 2000 .
[304] Harry DeAngelo,et al. Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock☆ , 1985 .
[305] René M. Stulz,et al. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control , 1988 .
[306] Dennis Leech,et al. CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: A NEW LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE OF BERLE AND MEANS , 1987 .
[307] A. Shleifer,et al. A Survey of Corporate Governance , 1996 .
[308] V. Carosso. The Wall Street Money Trust from Pujo through Medina , 1973, Business History Review.
[309] Charles E. Wasley,et al. The Role of Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance : Evidence from the Netherlands , 2000 .
[310] A. A. B. join. Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust , 1931 .
[311] Ulrike Hoffmann-Burchardi. Corporate Governance Rules and the Value of Control - A Study of German Dual-Class Share , 1999 .
[312] B. Douglas Bernheim,et al. Common marketing agency as a device for facilitating collusion , 1985 .
[313] P. S. Florence,et al. Ownership, control and success of large companies : an analysis of English industrial structure and policy, 1936-1951 , 1961 .
[314] J. Schumpeter. The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle , 1934 .
[315] Pay for Performance? Government Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts , 2001 .
[316] Gary B. Gorton,et al. Corporate governance, ownership dispersion and efficiency: Empirical evidence from Austrian cooperative banking , 1999 .
[317] Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation , 1999 .
[318] Alexander Dyck,et al. The Bubble and the Media , 2002 .
[319] H. T. Warshow. The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United States , 1924 .
[320] Klaus M. Schmidt. The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach , 1996 .
[321] Matthew T. Billett,et al. The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return , 1995 .
[322] A. Tabarrok. The separation of commercial and investment banking: The morgans vs. The rockefellers , 1998 .
[323] J. Franks,et al. Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies? , 2001 .
[324] Jerold B. Warner,et al. On corporate governance: A study of proxy contests , 1983 .
[325] Stuart L. Gillan,et al. A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence , 1998 .
[326] Claudio Loderer,et al. Labor Participation in Corporate Policy-Making Decisions: West Germany's Experience with Codetermination , 1987 .
[327] Caroline M. Fohlin. The rise of interlocking directorates in imperial Germany , 1995 .
[328] K. Bechmann,et al. A Regulation of Bids for Dual Class Shares. Implication: Two Shares—One Price , 2003 .
[329] M. Harris,et al. Corporate governance: Voting rights and majority rules , 1988 .
[330] Sanjai Bhagat,et al. The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and Firm Performance , 1997 .
[331] W. Lippmann,et al. Drift and Mastery , 1914 .
[332] Ronen Israel,et al. The Design of Internal Control and Capital Structure , 1996 .
[333] Richard S. Ruback,et al. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence , 2002 .
[334] Sanford J. Grossman,et al. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM , 1983 .
[335] Dennis Leech,et al. OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: A SIMPLE-GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH* , 1987 .
[336] L. Bebchuk. Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law , 1992 .
[337] Ekkehart Boehmer,et al. Voting Control in German Corporations , 2003 .
[338] M. Weisbach,et al. The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF , 1997 .
[339] K. Hopt,et al. Comparative corporate governance : the state of the art and emerging research , 1998 .
[340] Kathryn E. Spier,et al. Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation , 1993 .
[341] M. C. Jensen,et al. Harvard Business School; SSRN; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit , 1976 .
[342] Sherwin Rosen,et al. Contracts and the Market for Executives , 1990 .
[343] E. Gerum,et al. Economics of Labor Co-Determination in View of Corporate Governance , 1998 .
[344] H. Demsetz,et al. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences , 1985, Journal of Political Economy.
[345] Caroline M. Fohlin. Capital mobilisation and utilisation in latecomer economies: Germany and Italy compared , 1999 .
[346] G. Debreu. Theory of value : an axiomatic analysis of economic equilibrium , 1960 .
[347] Joseph L. Weiner. The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation , 1964 .
[348] Patrick Bolton,et al. Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information , 2000, Journal of Political Economy.
[349] Josef Lakonishok,et al. Corporate Governance through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications , 1993 .
[350] A. Poulsen,et al. Linking pay to performance--compensation proposals in the S&P 500 , 2001 .
[351] Wolfgang Streeck,et al. Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations , 1997 .
[352] Benjamin E. Hermalin,et al. Board of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature. (Part 1: A Review of the Literature on Corporate Governance) , 2003 .
[353] M. Aoki. Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm , 2013 .
[354] Ernst Maug. Boards of directors and capital structure: Alternative forms of corporate restructuring , 1997 .
[355] E. Herman. Corporate Control, Corporate Power , 1982 .
[356] P. Birks,et al. Breach of trust , 2002 .
[357] W. Dugger. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .
[358] Theodor Baums. Shareholder Representation and Proxy Voting in the European Union: A Comparative Study , 1997 .
[359] Arnoud Boot. Relationship Banking: What Do We Know? , 2000 .
[360] René M. Stulz,et al. Do Banking Shocks Affect Borrowing Firm Performance? An Analysis of the Japanese Experience , 1998 .
[361] John Leahy,et al. Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications and the Performance of Large British Companies , 1991 .
[362] Philip E. Strahan,et al. Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms , 2000 .
[363] J. Cable,et al. INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND PROFIT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LARGE U.K. COMPANIES , 1978 .
[364] B. Cheffins. Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom , 2000 .
[365] Oliver Hart,et al. One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control , 1987 .
[366] Benjamin E. Hermalin,et al. Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency , 1990 .
[367] Familial Control, Size and Performance in the Largest French Firms , 1980 .
[368] Kornelius Kraft,et al. Economic Effects of Codetermination , 1993 .
[369] M. Roe. Comparative Corporate Governance , 1997 .
[370] A. A. B. join. For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note , 1932 .
[371] D. Scharfstein,et al. The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan , 1990 .
[372] Ronald C. Anderson,et al. Ownership Studies: The Data Source Does Matter , 1997, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
[373] Jonathan M. Karpoff,et al. On the uses of corporate governance provisions , 1998 .
[374] Helen Short,et al. Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: Evidence from the UK , 1999 .
[375] Jeffrey B. Liebman,et al. Are CEOS Really Paid Like Bureaucrats , 1998 .
[376] R. Higgins,et al. CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY AND CONGLOMERATE MERGER , 1975 .
[377] Klaus Gugler,et al. Corporate Governance and Economic Performance , 2001 .
[378] Y. Amihud,et al. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread , 1986 .
[379] D. Leech. Ownership Concentration and Control in Large U.S. Corporations in the1930s: An Analysis of the TNEC Sample , 1987 .
[380] L. Renneboog,et al. Corporate governance regimes : convergence and diversity , 2004 .
[381] George J. Benston,et al. Determinants of bid-asked spreads in the over-the-counter market , 1974 .
[382] Richard Sedric Fox Eells,et al. The meaning of modern business : an introduction to the philosophy of large corporate enterprise , 1960 .
[383] F. Easterbrook,et al. The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer , 1981 .
[384] O. Williamson. Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations , 1979, The Journal of Law and Economics.
[385] Ian Ayres,et al. Filling gap in incomplete contracts: an economic theory of default rules , 1989 .
[386] Ronald C. Anderson,et al. Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 , 2003 .
[387] M. Roe,et al. A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance , 1991 .
[388] O. Hart,et al. The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons , 1996 .
[389] D. Larcker,et al. Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey , 2002 .
[390] D. Leech. Incentives To Corporate Governance Activism , 2002 .
[391] J. Macey,et al. A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail , 1985 .
[392] U. Peyer,et al. Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation and Share Prices , 2001 .
[393] Douglas W. Diamond,et al. A Theory of Bank Capital , 1999 .
[394] T. Noe,et al. The design of corporate boards: Composition, compensation, factions, and turnover , 1996 .
[395] Mark J. Loewenstein. The Conundrum of Executive Compensation , 2000 .
[396] J. Coffee,et al. Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation , 1994 .
[397] Walter N. Torous,et al. An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization , 1989, World Scientific Reference on Contingent Claims Analysis in Corporate Finance.
[398] Stuart L. Gillan,et al. Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors , 2000 .
[399] J. D. de Long,et al. Understanding America's Hesitant Steps Toward Financial Capitalism: Politics, the Depression, and the Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking , 2001 .
[400] Andrei Shleifer,et al. Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms , 1990 .
[401] Ehud Kamar. A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law , 2003 .
[402] Kevin J. Murphy,et al. Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory , 1988 .
[403] Michael C. Jensen,et al. Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market , 1985 .
[404] Carlos D. Ramirez. Did J. P. Morgan's Men Add Liquidity? Corporate Investment, Cash Flow, and Financial Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth Century , 1995 .
[405] 川島 いづみ. Joel Seligman:Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights--The One Common Share,One Vote Controversy(54 Geo.Wash.L.Rev.,1986),George W.Dent,Jr.:Dual Class Capitalization--A Reply to Professor Seligman(54 Geo.Wash.L.Rev.,1986) , 1988 .
[406] Colin Mayer,et al. Ownership and Control of German Corporations , 2000 .
[407] Roni Michaely,et al. Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations , 1999 .
[408] Caroline M. Fohlin. Bank Securities Holdings and Industrial Finance Before World War I: Britain and Germany Compared , 1997 .
[409] Kevin J. Murphy,et al. Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives , 1990 .
[410] Louis Loss,et al. Fundamentals of Securities Regulation , 1995 .
[411] Charles W. Calomiris,et al. American Economic Association The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements , 2007 .
[412] M. Pagano,et al. The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do European Companies List Abroad? , 1999 .
[413] Michel A. Habib,et al. Firm Value and Managerial Incentives , 2000 .
[414] Victor P. Goldberg. Regulation and Administered Contracts , 1976 .
[415] Eric Maskin,et al. Contractual contingencies and renegotiation , 1995 .
[416] S. Ongena,et al. Bank Relationships: A Review , 1998 .
[417] Luigi Zingales. The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience , 1994 .
[418] William L. Megginson,et al. Restricted Voting Stock, Acquisition Premiums, and the Market Value of Corporate Control , 1990 .
[419] M. Rin,et al. Banks as a Catalyst for Industrialization , 1996 .
[420] Thomas J. Zwirlein,et al. The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance , 1992 .
[421] A. Gerschenkron,et al. Economic backwardness in historical perspective : a book of essays , 1964 .
[422] H. Steinmann,et al. Der mitbestimmte Aufsichtsrat : eine empirische Untersuchung , 1988 .
[423] Anil Shivdasani,et al. Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers , 1997 .
[424] G. Baker,et al. CEO Incentives and Firm Size , 2002 .
[425] Bengt Holmstrom,et al. Moral Hazard and Observability , 1979 .
[426] Charu G. Raheja. The Interaction of Insiders and Outsiders in Monitoring: A Theory of Corporate Boards , 2003 .
[427] M. Hellwig. On the Economics and Politics of Corporate Finance and Corporate Control , 1998 .
[428] Jeffrey B. Liebman,et al. The Taxation of Executive Compensation , 2000, Tax Policy and the Economy.
[429] A. Poulsen,et al. Proxy contests and corporate change: implications for shareholder wealth , 1998 .
[430] John W. Byrd,et al. Do outside directors monitor managers , 1992 .
[431] M. Dewatripont. The 'leading shareholder' strategy, takeover contests and stock price dynamics , 1993 .
[432] B. Black,et al. Strengthening Brazil's Securities Markets , 2000 .
[433] S. M. Tiniç. The Economics of Liquidity Services , 1972 .
[434] Culture, openness, and finance , 2003 .
[435] Darwin V. Neher. Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective , 1999 .
[436] J. Molín,et al. The Optimality of the Mandatory Bid Rule , 1997 .
[437] G. Means. The Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry , 1931 .
[438] Erik Berglöf. Corporate control and capital structure : essays on property rights and financial contracts , 1991 .
[439] Anil Shivdasani,et al. Valuation effects of bank financing in acquisitions , 2003 .
[440] Alexander Ljungqvist,et al. The Role of Hostile Stakes in German Corporate Governance , 2001 .
[441] F. Barca,et al. The Control of Corporate Europe , 2002 .
[442] M. C. Jensen. Value Maximization and the Corporate Objective Function , 2000 .
[443] H. Degryse,et al. RELATIONSHIP LENDING WITHIN A BANK-BASED SYSTEM: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN SMALL BUSINESS DATA , 2000 .
[444] Larry H. P. Lang,et al. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations , 2002 .
[445] James P. Smith,et al. Healthy bodies and thick wallets: the dual relation between health and economic status. , 1999, The journal of economic perspectives : a journal of the American Economic Association.
[446] H. Pfeiffer. Die Macht der Banken : die personellen Verflechtungen der Commerzbank, der Deutschen Bank und der Dresdner Bank mit Unternehmen , 1993 .
[447] Thomas S. Zorn,et al. The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders , 1990 .
[448] Mike Burkart,et al. Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection , 2001 .
[449] Kristian Rydqvist. Dual-Class Shares: A Review , 1992 .
[450] Gary B. Gorton,et al. Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms , 1996 .
[451] A. Thakor,et al. Bank Loan Commitment Contracts: Data, Theory, and Tests , 1997 .
[452] D. Harhoff,et al. Lending relationships in Germany - Empirical evidence from survey data , 1998 .
[453] Anat R. Admati,et al. Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.
[454] M. Josephson. ROBBER BARONS , 1934 .
[455] R. Liefmann. Kartelle und Trusts und die Weiterbildung der volkswirtschaftlichen Organisation , 1924 .
[456] Arno Pfannschmidt. Personelle Verflechtungen über Aufsichtsräte : Mehrfachmandate in deutschen Unternehmen , 1993 .
[457] Sheridan Titman,et al. Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids , 1990, Journal of Political Economy.
[458] Otto Jeidels. Das Verhältnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie : mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Eisenindustrie , 1905 .
[459] John S. Y. Chiu,et al. The Effect of Separation of Ownership and Control on the Performance of the Large Firm , 1968 .
[460] John J. McConnell,et al. The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations , 1984 .
[461] John J. McConnell,et al. The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations , 1983 .
[462] Ronald W. Best,et al. Alternative information sources and the information content of bank loans , 1993 .
[463] Stefano Rossi,et al. Cross-Country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions , 2003 .
[464] A. Shleifer,et al. Reversions of Excess Pension Assets after Takeovers , 1990 .
[465] G. Stapledon. Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance , 1996 .
[466] Political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public companies , 1990 .
[467] R. Goldsmith. The distribution of ownership in the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations , 1940 .
[468] Luigi Zingales,et al. The Governance of the New Enterprise , 2000 .
[469] Tatiana Nenova. The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country Analysis , 2000 .
[470] J. Mirrlees. The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization , 1976 .
[471] B. Black,et al. General Principles of Company Law for Transition Economies (English Version) , 1998 .
[472] E. M. B. join,et al. For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees , 1932 .
[473] Michael Bradley,et al. Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control , 1980 .
[474] S. Prowse,et al. Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the United States and Japan , 1990 .
[475] V. Narayanan,et al. Inventory Rules, Taxation and Institutions' Trading Decisions , 1994 .
[476] Florencio López‐de‐Silanes,et al. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance , 1999 .
[477] R. Romano,et al. The Genius of American Corporate Law , 1994 .
[478] Steven N. Kaplan,et al. Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s , 2001 .
[479] R. Liefmann. Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften : eine Studie über den modernen Kapitalismus und das Effektenwesen (in Deutschland, den Vereinigten Staaten, England, Frankreich, Belgien und der Schweiz) , 1909 .
[480] A. Shleifer,et al. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.
[481] Artur Raviv,et al. Corporate control contests and capital structure , 1988 .
[482] Kevin F. Hallock. Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation , 1997, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
[483] René M. Stulz,et al. Firm size and the gains from acquisitions , 2004 .
[484] Kjell G. Nyborg,et al. Financial Innovations and Corporate Insolvency , 1999 .
[485] C. Hennessy,et al. A Unified Model of Distorted Investment: Theory and Evidence , 2002 .
[486] Colin Mayer,et al. Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure , 1996 .
[487] A. Shleifer,et al. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis , 1988 .
[488] R. Romano,et al. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance , 2004 .
[489] Karl Warneryd,et al. Inside vs. Outside Ownership - a Political Theory of the Firm , 2000 .
[490] Mauro Gutiérrez. A Contractual Approach to the Regulation Corporate Directors' Fiduciary Duties , 2000 .
[491] James S. Linck,et al. What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives , 1999 .
[492] Monlka Schnitzer. Breach of trust in takeovers and the optimal corporate charter , 1995 .
[493] M. P. Narayanan,et al. Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results , 1985 .
[494] B. Black,et al. Corporate Law from Scratch , 1996 .
[495] B. Black,et al. Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? , 2000 .
[496] N. Vafeas. Board meeting frequency and firm performance , 1999 .
[497] S. Ongena,et al. Quality and duration of banking relationships , 1998 .
[498] A. Hirschman,et al. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States , 1970 .
[499] Florencio López‐de‐Silanes,et al. Corporate Ownership Around the World , 1998 .
[500] Sales and Elections as Methods for Transferring Corporate Control , 2000 .
[501] R. Marris,et al. The economic theory of "managerial" capitalism , 1964 .
[502] L. Bebchuk. A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control , 1999 .
[503] Janet Mitchell. Bad Debts and the Cleaning of Banks' Balance Sheets: An Application to Economies in Transition , 2001 .
[504] Thomas F. Hellmann,et al. The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts , 1998 .
[505] C. Holderness. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control. (Part 1: A Review of the Literature on Corporate Governance) , 2003 .
[506] David Aboody,et al. CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures , 2000 .
[507] J. Tirole. Hierarchies and bureaucracies , 1985 .
[508] A. Gerschenkron,et al. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. A Book of Essays , 1963 .
[509] Belen Villalonga,et al. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance , 2001 .
[510] J. Grundfest. Subordination of American capital , 1990 .
[511] S. Mullainathan,et al. Executive Compensation and Incentives: the Impact of Takeover Legislation , 1998 .
[512] Hans R. Stoll,et al. Transaction costs and the small firm effect , 1983 .
[513] E. Wymeersch. Do we need a law on groups of companies , 2003 .
[514] Armando Gomes,et al. Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism , 2005 .
[515] P. Bolton,et al. Ownership and Managerial Competition: Employee, Customer, or Outside Ownership , 2001 .
[516] Marc Goergen,et al. Why Are the Levels of Control (So) Different in German and U.K. Companies? Evidence from Initial Public Offerings , 2003 .
[517] D. Siniscalco,et al. Privatisation and Institutions: A Cross Country Analysis , 2000, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[518] James A. Brickley,et al. The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980 , 1988 .
[519] Lucian Arye Bebchuk. Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy , 2000 .
[520] René M. Stulz,et al. Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and the Home Bias , 2002 .
[521] H. Manne,et al. Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control , 1965, Journal of Political Economy.