The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection

©  David Sobel C , many philosophers have claimed, asks too much of us to be a plausible ethical theory. Indeed, Consequentialism’s severe demandingness is often claimed to be its chief flaw. The Demandingness Objection might be leveled against other moral theories as well, but the Objection is thought to apply paradigmatically against Consequentialism, and I will only consider it in this context. Despite the widespread influence of the Objection, it is obscure what the structure of the complaint is and why it is supposed to have force. My thesis is that as we come to better understand the Objection, we see that, even if it signals or tracks the existence of a real problem for Consequentialism, it cannot itself be a fundamental problem with the view. The Objection cannot itself provide good reason to break with Consequentialism since it must presuppose the truth of prior and independent breaks with Consequentialism. The way the Objection measures the demandingness of an ethical theory reflects rather than justifies being in the grip of key anti-Consequentialist conclusions. We should reject Consequentialism independently of the Objection or not at all. Such is the perceived force of the Objection that it moves a variety of philosophers who are attracted to the general Consequentialist framework. Indeed there is a cottage industry trying to amend Consequentialism so that it is less vulnerable to the Objection. Some champion Rule Consequentialism on the grounds that it will be less demanding. Others oer us agent-centered prerogatives. Some recommend a satisficing version, since it would demand less of us. Some adopt a “scalar” understanding of Consequentialism with the upshot that the view makes no “demands” at all but merely tells us what is morally better and worse. Still others recommend a hybrid of such alternatives to familiar maximizing Act Consequentialism. Against such views, my arguments also make trouble for those who are