Counterlogicals as Counterconventionals

We develop and defend a new approach to counterlogicals. Non-vacuous counterlogicals, we argue, fall within a broader class of counterfactuals known as counterconventionals . Existing semantics for counterconventionals (developed by Einheuser ( Philosophical Studies, 127 (3), 459–482 ( 2006 )) and (Kocurek et al. Philosophers’ Imprint , 20(22), 1–27 ( 2020 )) allow counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of predicates and relations. We extend these theories to counterlogicals by allowing counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of logical vocabulary. This yields an elegant semantics for counterlogicals that avoids problems with the usual impossible worlds semantics. We conclude by showing how this approach can be extended to counterpossibles more generally.

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