Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates
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Edith Hemaspaandra | Lane A. Hemaspaandra | Felix Brandt | Markus Brill | F. Brandt | L. A. Hemaspaandra | Markus Brill | E. Hemaspaandra | L. Hemaspaandra
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