Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence

Abstract Normal form games are nearly compact and continuous (NCC) if they can be understood as games played on strategy spaces that are dense subsets of the strategy spaces of larger compact games with jointly continuous payoffs. There are intrinsic algebraic, measure theoretic, functional analysis, and finite approximability characterizations of NCC games. NCC games have finitely additive equilibria, and all their finitely additive equilibria are equivalent to countably additive equilibria on metric compactifications. The equilibrium set of an NCC game depends upper hemicontinuously on the specification of the game and contains only the limits of approximate equilibria of approximate games.

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