Belief Ascription, Metaphor, and Intensional Identification

This article discusses the extension of ViewGen, an algorithm derived for belief ascription, to the areas of intensional object identification and metaphor. ViewGen represents the beliefs of agents as explicit, partitioned proposition sets known as environments. Environments are convenient, even essential, for addressing important pragmatic issues of reasoning. The article concentrates on showing that the transfer of information in metaphors, intensional object identification, and ordinary, nonmetaphorical belief ascription can all be seen as different manifestations of a single environment-amalgamation process. The article also briefly discusses the extension of ViewGen to speech-act processing and the addition of a heuristic-based, relevance-determination procedure, and justifies the partitioning approach to belief ascription.

[1]  Jacques Wainer,et al.  A syntactic approach to introspection and reasoning about the beliefs of other agents , 1991, Fundam. Informaticae.

[2]  Derek Partridge,et al.  The foundation of artificial intelligence---a sourcebook , 1990 .

[3]  G. Lakoff.  Women, fire, and dangerous things : what categories reveal about the mind , 1988, Dialogue.

[4]  Hector J. Levesque,et al.  Intention is Choice with Commitment , 1990, Artif. Intell..

[5]  John A. Barnden,et al.  Towards a paradigm shift in belief representation methodology , 1990, J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell..

[6]  John A. Barnden,et al.  Belief, Metaphorically Speaking , 1989, KR.

[7]  Yorick Wilks,et al.  A tractable machine dictionary as a resource for computational semantics , 1989 .

[8]  Ted Briscoe,et al.  Book Reviews: Computational Lexicography for Natural Language Processing , 1990, CL.

[9]  J. L. Moigne.  Advances in artificial intelligence-II: B. du BOULAY, D. HOGG and L. STEELS (eds.) Seventh European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI-86, Brighton, UK, July 20–25, 1986 North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1987, xiv + 682 pages, Df1.200.00 , 1988 .

[10]  Stuart C. Shapiro,et al.  A Model for Belief Revision , 1988, Artif. Intell..

[11]  Yorick Wilks,et al.  Shifting the Belief Engine into Higher Gear , 1988, AIMSA.

[12]  Ronald Fagin,et al.  Belief, Awareness, and Limited Reasoning. , 1987, Artif. Intell..

[13]  Bipin Indurkhya,et al.  Approximate Semantic Transference: A Computational Theory of Metaphors and Analogies , 1987 .

[14]  Yorick Wilks,et al.  Multiple Agents and the Heuristic Ascription of Belief , 1987, IJCAI.

[15]  Devika Subramanian,et al.  The Relevance of Irrelevance , 1987, IJCAI.

[16]  Afzal Ballim.  The subjective ascription of belief to agents , 1987 .

[17]  Yorick Wilks,et al.  Belief Systems: Ascribing Belief , 1987, KIFS.

[18]  John Dinsmore.  Mental Spaces from a Functional Perspective , 1987, Cogn. Sci..

[19]  Mark L. Johnson.  The body in the mind: the bodily basis of meaning , 1987 .

[20]  C. Raymond Perrault.  An application of default logic to speech act theory , 1987 .

[21]  John Dinsmore,et al.  Book review: MENTAL SPACES: ASPECTS OF MEANING CONSTRUCTION IN NATURAL LANGUAGE by Gilles Fauconnier (Bradford/MIT Press) , 1987, SGAR.

[22]  William J. Rapaport,et al.  Logical Foundations for Belief Representation , 1986, Cogn. Sci..

[23]  J. Wiebe,et al.  Representing de re and de dicto belief reports in discourse and narrative , 1986, Proceedings of the IEEE.

[24]  Stuart C. Shapiro,et al.  SNePS Considered as a Fully Intensional Propositional Semantic Network , 1986, AAAI.

[25]  John A. Barnden.  A Viewpoint Distinction in the Representation of Propositional Attitudes , 1986, AAAI.

[26]  Brian Falkenhainer,et al.  The Structure-Mapping Engine * , 2003 .

[27]  John A. Barnden,et al.  Imputations and Explications: Representational Problems in Treatments of Propositional Attitudes , 1986, Cogn. Sci..

[28]  Brendan McGonigle,et al.  Reasoning and Discourse Processes , 1986 .

[29]  D. Sperber,et al.  Relevance: Communication and Cognition , 1989 .

[30]  K. Konolige.  A deduction model of belief , 1986 .

[31]  John A. Barnden,et al.  Interpreting Propositional Attitude Reports: Towards Greater Freedom and Control , 1986, European Conference on Artificial Intelligence.

[32]  John A. Barnden.  Imputations and Explications: Representational Problems in Treatments of Propositional Attitudes , 1986, Cogn. Sci..

[33]  Hector J. Levesque,et al.  Speech Acts and Rationality , 1985, ACL.

[34]  Gilles Fauconnier,et al.  Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language , 1985 .

[35]  Hector J. Levesque,et al.  A Logic of Implicit and Explicit Belief , 1984, AAAI.

[36]  P. Johnson-Laird.  Mental models , 1989 .

[37]  John A. Barnden.  Intensions as Such: An Outline , 1983, IJCAI.

[38]  J. Hobbs.  Metaphor Interpretation as Selective Inferencing: Cognitive Processes in Understanding Metaphor (Part 2) , 1983 .

[39]  Janusz S. Bień,et al.  Beliefs, Points of View, and Multiple Environments , 1983, Cogn. Sci..

[40]  J. Hobbs.  Metaphor Interpretation as Selective Inferencing: Cognitive Processes in Understanding Metaphor (Part 1) , 1983 .

[41]  Kurt Konolige.  A Deductive Model of Belief , 1983, IJCAI.

[42]  Stuart C. Shapiro,et al.  Intensional Concepts in Propositional Semantic Networks , 1982, Cogn. Sci..

[43]  Wendy G. Lehnert,et al.  Strategies for Natural Language Processing , 1982 .

[44]  John McCarthy,et al.  SOME PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ARTI CIAL INTELLIGENCE , 1987 .

[45]  Jaime G. Carbonell,et al.  Metaphor : an inescapable phenomenon in natural language comprehension , 1981 .

[46]  G. Lakoff,et al.  Metaphors We Live by , 1982 .

[47]  C. Raymond Perrault,et al.  A Plan-Based Analysis of Indirect Speech Act , 1980, CL.

[48]  Lewis G. Creary,et al.  Propositional Attitudes: Fregean Representation and Simulative Reasoning , 1979, IJCAI.

[49]  Yorick Wilks,et al.  Speech Acts and Multiple Environments , 1979, IJCAI.

[50]  Gary G. Hendrix,et al.  Encoding Knowledge in Partitioned Networks , 1979 .

[51]  Yorick Wilks,et al.  Making Preferences More Active , 1978, Artif. Intell..

[52]  Eugene Charniak,et al.  On the Use of Framed Knowledge in Language Comprehension , 1978, Artif. Intell..

[53]  D. Davidson.  What Metaphors Mean , 1978, Critical Inquiry.

[54]  C. Raymond Perrault,et al.  Participating in dialogues: understanding via plan deduction , 1978 .

[55]  Barbara J. Grosz,et al.  The Representation and Use of Focus in a System for Understanding Dialogs , 1977, IJCAI.

[56]  C. Driver.  The relevance of relevance , 1976 .

[57]  Patrick Henry Winston,et al.  The psychology of computer vision , 1976, Pattern Recognit..

[58]  Marvin Minsky,et al.  A framework for representing knowledge" in the psychology of computer vision , 1975 .

[59]  Nuel D. Belnap,et al.  Entailment : the logic of relevance and necessity , 1975 .

[60]  Marvin Minsky,et al.  A framework for representing knowledge , 1974 .

[61]  Donald Michie,et al.  Machine Intelligence 4 , 1970 .

[62]  A. Koller,et al.  Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language , 1969 .

[63]  J. Austin.  How to do things with words , 1962 .

[64]  Willard Van Orman Quine,et al.  Word and Object , 1960 .