From Market to Clan: How Organizational Control Affects Trust In Defense Acquisition

Abstract : Military acquisition relies upon industry for new product development, but market organizational control is not recommended for knowledge-intensive work. Unfortunately, increasing hierarchy-control mechanisms, such as formalization, could reduce trust. What is the appropriate balance of control mechanisms and trust for an Integrated Product Team (IPT) in the DoD acquisition realm? We conducted 18 interviews and a survey in a major military acquisition program office employing (IPTs), Alpha Contracting, and collocation. We found that the relationship between formalization and trust was different between government and contractor team members. Acquisition managers must understand the relationships between control mechanisms and trust within and between organizations to increase collaboration between government and contract personnel. Trust is proposed as a way to extend market control of R&D and new product development.

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