The effect of recommended contributions in the voluntary provision of public goods

Recommended contributions are often observed in fundraising campaigns for charitable and other public goods. We present an experiment investigating the impact of recommended contributions in a voluntary threshold public goods process. We find that when valuations for the public good are heterogeneous, recommended contributions significantly increase the likelihood of efficient provision, although when valuations are homogeneous, the effect of recommendations is less compelling. This article represents a fast step in understanding recommended contributions and other nonbinding, cheap-talk announcements in public goods provision and charitable contributions. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

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