Evolutionary Game Dynamics for Two Interacting Populations in A Co-evolving Environment

We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the environment: the payoff matrix varies with the changing environment and at the same time, the state of the environment is affected indirectly by the changing payoff matrix through the evolving population profiles. For such co-evolutionary dynamics, we investigate whether convergence will take place, and if so, how. In particular, we identify the scenarios where oscillation offers the best predictions of long-run behavior by using reversible system theory. The obtained results are useful to describe the evolution of multi-community societies in which individuals' payoffs and societal feedback interact.

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