Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

We consider the problem of fairly allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. We search for solutions satisfying resource-monotonicity, the requirement that all agents be affected in the same direction when the amount to divide changes. Although there are resource-monotonic selections from the Pareto solution, there are none satisfying the distributional requirements of no-envy or individual rationality from equal division. We then consider the weakening of resource-monotonicity obtained by allowing only changes in the amount to divide that do not reverse the direction of the inequality between the amount to divide and the sum of the preferred amounts. We show that there is essentially a unique selection from the solution that associates with each economy its set of envy-free and efficient allocations satisfying this property of one-sided resource-monotonicity: it is the uniform rule, a solution that has played a central role in previous analyses of the problem.

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